JunkMail Victim (9/1/2006)
I've found them to concentrate on the compiled executables of the client applications, but not think much about the unencrypted business logic that resides in stored procedures and triggers inthe database environment. In our case, they seem to think of databases as only data storage, and don't consider how powerful and immediate the environment really is.
The fact that stored procedures, triggers, views and other database objects containing SQL are not encrypted (or at best weakly encrypted) is really not an issue. By default, a user account that is not a member of the DBO or sysadmin role doesn't have VIEW SCHEMA, ALTER TRACE, VIEW SERVER STATE, etc. permission unless you explicitly grant it to them, so they shouldn't be able to see the SQL. A user account for use by the application should be a member of a role that grants them only exec permission on specific stored procedures and maybe access to some tables. That's what the auditor should be looking for.
"The universe is complicated and for the most part beyond your control, but your life is only as complicated as you choose it to be."