K. Brian Kelley (8/13/2014)
"Air gaps are failed infosec" hasn't led to SCADA systems directly connected to the Internet. That's because there are SCADA systems that already are.
Yeah, sure, so some people already get it wrong means it's fine to encourage more people to get it wrong, does it?
You may have a valid argument somewhere in this discussion, but that nonsemnsense just lost you all your credibility with me.
And keep in mind that SCADA extends beyond nuclear.
So what? Because SCADA covers more than nuclear we should not bother about SCADA safety for nuclear?
Almost any time someone does a study on SCADA systems, what is found? Are the types of controls you indicate should be in place for nuclear what is found? Is it even close? What leads to that thinking?
What thinking is that that you are talking about? You don't appear to want people to understand what you mean. Are you asking whether things appropriate for nuclear are found every time a study is done on non-nuclear? If so, what relevance do you think the answer to that question could imaginably have to whether those things are important to the nuclear case? If not, what on earth does that string of words mean?
Tom