The Importance of Clear Data Displays

  • Comments posted to this topic are about the item The Importance of Clear Data Displays

  • Ooooo... don't get me started.  This was a stupid mistake on all fronts including the human checks and balances that are supposed to be in place even for such mundane tasks as simple transit.  My heart goes out to those that lost family because of something so completely idiotic.

    --Jeff Moden


    RBAR is pronounced "ree-bar" and is a "Modenism" for Row-By-Agonizing-Row.
    First step towards the paradigm shift of writing Set Based code:
    ________Stop thinking about what you want to do to a ROW... think, instead, of what you want to do to a COLUMN.

    Change is inevitable... Change for the better is not.


    Helpful Links:
    How to post code problems
    How to Post Performance Problems
    Create a Tally Function (fnTally)

  • A huge amount of effort goes into designing the UI for customer facing websites to ensure that nothing impedes the customers path to purchase.

    In my experience the level of effort that goes into the UI for back office and internal systems is significantly lower.  Sadly such back office systems are what makes it possible to deliver to the customer.  Systems should always strive to make it easy for staff to do their jobs.

    In the case of USS McCain this accident happened in commercial waters in peace time.  If this happened during war the results could have been so much worse.  Not only would the problems result in the loss of the ship but also place at risk whatever the ship was defending.  UIs in safety critical systems need to be subject to the most stringent user testing.

  • :exclamation:

    The blame isn't on the interface, it's on the management.

    http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=103130

    The collision between John S. McCain and Alnic MC was also avoidable and resulted primarily from complacency, over-confidence and lack of procedural compliance. A major contributing factor to the collision was sub-standard level of knowledge regarding the operation of the ship control console. In particular, McCain's commanding officer disregarded recommendations from his executive officer, navigator and senior watch officer to set sea and anchor watch teams in a timely fashion to ensure the safe and effective operation of the ship. With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.

    If you don't come from a Navy or sailing background, it's easy to blame the software, but for those of us that have served and still keep in contact with active duty buddies, there's a lot of management issues in the Navy and other armed services that contribute to these accidents.

  • Looks like a couple things. Certainly training/management is an issue. I'd still say the UI clearly didn't make this easy.

    I didn't mean to imply this was just software. It seems from the various reports that a few things went wrong, people panicked a bit, and they didn't react quick enough. I'd expect the UI, regardless of whether people were trained well or not, to make it clear who has control of what here.

  • chrisn-585491 - Monday, November 6, 2017 6:40 AM

    :exclamation:

    The blame isn't on the interface, it's on the management.

    http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=103130

    The collision between John S. McCain and Alnic MC was also avoidable and resulted primarily from complacency, over-confidence and lack of procedural compliance. A major contributing factor to the collision was sub-standard level of knowledge regarding the operation of the ship control console. In particular, McCain's commanding officer disregarded recommendations from his executive officer, navigator and senior watch officer to set sea and anchor watch teams in a timely fashion to ensure the safe and effective operation of the ship. With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.

    If you don't come from a Navy or sailing background, it's easy to blame the software, but for those of us that have served and still keep in contact with active duty buddies, there's a lot of management issues in the Navy and other armed services that contribute to these accidents.

    +1,000,000 to that!  Echoes my original post above.

    --Jeff Moden


    RBAR is pronounced "ree-bar" and is a "Modenism" for Row-By-Agonizing-Row.
    First step towards the paradigm shift of writing Set Based code:
    ________Stop thinking about what you want to do to a ROW... think, instead, of what you want to do to a COLUMN.

    Change is inevitable... Change for the better is not.


    Helpful Links:
    How to post code problems
    How to Post Performance Problems
    Create a Tally Function (fnTally)

  • I guess my next question would be, does anyone actually have pictures of what these displays look like for the given conditions?

    --Jeff Moden


    RBAR is pronounced "ree-bar" and is a "Modenism" for Row-By-Agonizing-Row.
    First step towards the paradigm shift of writing Set Based code:
    ________Stop thinking about what you want to do to a ROW... think, instead, of what you want to do to a COLUMN.

    Change is inevitable... Change for the better is not.


    Helpful Links:
    How to post code problems
    How to Post Performance Problems
    Create a Tally Function (fnTally)

  • ...Apparently this was an error in how the navigation and steering controls were configured. You can read about this over at Ars Technicaread about this over at Ars Technica, but essentially one crewman was having difficulties steering and managing the speed. The officer in charge ordered speed control transferred to another computer, but both speed and steering were transferred. This caused confusion as everyone thought one person was steering, which wasn't working, and another person was responsible for speed. In the time during which the crew scrambled to determine why they couldn't steered, the ship crossed into the path of the merchant ship and a collision occurred...

    My understanding is that these naval ships are traveling at approximately 40 mph tops. Does a few moments of confusion over speed and direction really explain a collision with a commercial ship in open water? It's not like an 18 wheel trailer truck zipping down the highway during rush hour.

    "Do not seek to follow in the footsteps of the wise. Instead, seek what they sought." - Matsuo Basho

  • Eric M Russell - Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:40 PM

    ...Apparently this was an error in how the navigation and steering controls were configured. You can read about this over at Ars Technicaread about this over at Ars Technica, but essentially one crewman was having difficulties steering and managing the speed. The officer in charge ordered speed control transferred to another computer, but both speed and steering were transferred. This caused confusion as everyone thought one person was steering, which wasn't working, and another person was responsible for speed. In the time during which the crew scrambled to determine why they couldn't steered, the ship crossed into the path of the merchant ship and a collision occurred...

    My understanding is that these naval ships are traveling at approximately 40 mph tops. Does a few moments of confusion over speed and direction really explain a collision with a commercial ship in open water? It's not like an 18 wheel trailer truck zipping down the highway during rush hour.

    It can, actually.  They may only be travelling at 40mph tops (probably less,) but they weigh a LOT more than any 18-wheeler, it takes a long time to come to a stop in water (short of slamming into full astern,) they don't exactly turn on a dime, and in the case of the McCain it happened at ~5:00am.  Out on open water, at night, it can be very hard to see another ship, as they're likely only going to have running lights going.

  • Jeff Moden - Monday, November 6, 2017 5:38 PM

    I guess my next question would be, does anyone actually have pictures of what these displays look like for the given conditions?

    I reckon that is probably classified.....

  • kevaburg - Thursday, November 9, 2017 6:58 AM

    Jeff Moden - Monday, November 6, 2017 5:38 PM

    I guess my next question would be, does anyone actually have pictures of what these displays look like for the given conditions?

    I reckon that is probably classified.....

    Maybe but, for simple helm and engine control, I doubt it.  Even when we had tours of the submarines I was on, we didn't cover such things.

    --Jeff Moden


    RBAR is pronounced "ree-bar" and is a "Modenism" for Row-By-Agonizing-Row.
    First step towards the paradigm shift of writing Set Based code:
    ________Stop thinking about what you want to do to a ROW... think, instead, of what you want to do to a COLUMN.

    Change is inevitable... Change for the better is not.


    Helpful Links:
    How to post code problems
    How to Post Performance Problems
    Create a Tally Function (fnTally)

  • jasona.work - Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:55 PM

    Eric M Russell - Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:40 PM

    ...Apparently this was an error in how the navigation and steering controls were configured. You can read about this over at Ars Technicaread about this over at Ars Technica, but essentially one crewman was having difficulties steering and managing the speed. The officer in charge ordered speed control transferred to another computer, but both speed and steering were transferred. This caused confusion as everyone thought one person was steering, which wasn't working, and another person was responsible for speed. In the time during which the crew scrambled to determine why they couldn't steered, the ship crossed into the path of the merchant ship and a collision occurred...

    My understanding is that these naval ships are traveling at approximately 40 mph tops. Does a few moments of confusion over speed and direction really explain a collision with a commercial ship in open water? It's not like an 18 wheel trailer truck zipping down the highway during rush hour.

    It can, actually.  They may only be travelling at 40mph tops (probably less,) but they weigh a LOT more than any 18-wheeler, it takes a long time to come to a stop in water (short of slamming into full astern,) they don't exactly turn on a dime, and in the case of the McCain it happened at ~5:00am.  Out on open water, at night, it can be very hard to see another ship, as they're likely only going to have running lights going.

    Ships have radar and should have multiple lookouts in a shipping channel.

  • chrisn-585491 - Thursday, November 9, 2017 11:19 AM

    jasona.work - Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:55 PM

    Eric M Russell - Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:40 PM

    ...Apparently this was an error in how the navigation and steering controls were configured. You can read about this over at Ars Technicaread about this over at Ars Technica, but essentially one crewman was having difficulties steering and managing the speed. The officer in charge ordered speed control transferred to another computer, but both speed and steering were transferred. This caused confusion as everyone thought one person was steering, which wasn't working, and another person was responsible for speed. In the time during which the crew scrambled to determine why they couldn't steered, the ship crossed into the path of the merchant ship and a collision occurred...

    My understanding is that these naval ships are traveling at approximately 40 mph tops. Does a few moments of confusion over speed and direction really explain a collision with a commercial ship in open water? It's not like an 18 wheel trailer truck zipping down the highway during rush hour.

    It can, actually.  They may only be travelling at 40mph tops (probably less,) but they weigh a LOT more than any 18-wheeler, it takes a long time to come to a stop in water (short of slamming into full astern,) they don't exactly turn on a dime, and in the case of the McCain it happened at ~5:00am.  Out on open water, at night, it can be very hard to see another ship, as they're likely only going to have running lights going.

    Ships have radar and should have multiple lookouts in a shipping channel.

    Yes, but if you read the source article, the McCain bridge crew were confused about who had steering control, so even if one of the lookouts saw the Alnic (and looking at the diagram of manned stations, the McCain had ONE lookout on duty) they still couldn't have turned away.  As for the Alnic, they never tried to warn the McCain (blowing their whistle,) turn, or (presumably) reduce speed, which would indicate that *their* watch standers weren't exactly on the ball either.
    As a final comment on this, from previous articles when the accident happened, it also sounds like most of the time US warships run dark, which would make it even *harder* for the bridge crew of the Alnic to see them.

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